Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 3

Article 4

December 1979

The Right to Special Education in Illinois - Something Old and
Something New
David P. Kula

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David P. Kula, The Right to Special Education in Illinois - Something Old and Something New, 55 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 649 (1979).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol55/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

THE RIGHT TO SPECIAL EDUCATION IN ILLINOISSOMETHING OLD AND SOMETHING NEW
DAVID

P. KULA*

**

Recent legislative and judicial developments on both the state and
federal fronts have kindled an intense interest in the rights of the handicapped in the area of education. As a result, much emphasis has been
placed on the quality and adequacy of educational programs for the
handicapped, and significant improvements in educational services
have been made on a national scope. However, much of this newfound legislative and judicial energy has been directed only at the upper echelons of the administrative networks which must oversee the
provision of educational services.
Although it is too early to determine whether or not increased legislative and judicial pressure at the top of the administrative framework
has actually resulted in a corresponding improvement of services at the
grassroots level, it is probable that the rights of many handicapped children have been lost in the shuffle while new mandates are being given
their "shakedown" voyages. In this context, we will examine the present status of special education programs, with a heavy emphasis on Illinois statutes and cases. Hopefully, this article will provide the Illinois
practitioner, whether school board attorney or child advocate, with
working knowledge of the rights of his or her client, and, more importantly, with an awareness of the available remedies by which to vindicate those rights.
BACKGROUND

The federal constitution does not expressly provide a right to an
education, and in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,I the United States Supreme Court determined that education is
not among the rights implicitly protected by the Constitution. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that Rodriguez stands only for the princi*
Associate, Anthony Scariano & Associates; member of the Illinois Bar; J.D., DePaul University College of Law.
** The author extends his grateful appreciation to Alan T. Sraga, J.D., Illinois Institute of
Technology/Chicago-Kent College of Law, for his invaluable assistance in preparation of this
article.
i. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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pie "that equal educational opportunity is not measured in terms of
equal financial expenditures," 2 and that the provision of an inadequate
education which results in the absolute deprivation of education may
not satisfy the fourteenth amendment. 3 These interpretations of Rodriguez leave open the possibility of challenging inadequate special education services or the failure to provide any special education services
on equal protection or due process grounds. The Supreme Court, in
Brown v. Boardof Education,4 laid the foundation for the equal protection challenge when it stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments . . . . In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
it, is a right which must be made
the state has undertaken to provide
5
available to all on equal terms.
Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez,6 the Supreme Court laid the foundation for
a due process challenge, once a state chooses to operate a public school
system, when it determined that the state was thereby "constrained to
recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a
property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause. .... -7
8
In PennsylvaniaAssociationfor Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania
and Mills v. Board of Education,9 two federal district courts determined
that the exclusion of handicapped children from public school education could result in a denial of their constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection. P.A.R. C. was a class action on behalf of those
retarded students who had been excluded from the public schools, in
accordance with a Pennsylvania statute, ' 0 as untrainable or ineducable.
Although the three-judge district court approved a consent agreement
reached by the parties, it also chose to gratuitously comment upon the
constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs. The court found that the
Pennsylvania statute failed to provide for notice and a hearing before
excluding the retarded child from public education and thus violated
2. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
3. 411 U.S. at 24, 25. See Krass, The Right to Public Educationfor Handicapped Children. A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1034.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Id. at 493.
6. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
7. Id. at 574.
8. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modifying 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) [hereinafter cited as P.A.R.C.].
9. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
10. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1304, 13-1326, 13-1330(2), 13-1371 through 13-1380 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
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his right to due process. The court also questioned whether the -statute
could withstand the plaintiffs' equal protection claim even if a rational
basis analysis were used, since the parties agreed that all mentally retarded children were capable of benefiting from a program of education and training.I' Mills, another class action suit, was brought on
behalf of handicapped children in the District of Columbia to enjoin
their exclusion from the public schools and to compel the District of
Columbia to provide them with adequate education at public expense.
The court viewed a District of Columbia statute,' 2 which required parents to enroll their children in public or private schools, as presuppos-13
ing that educational opportunity would be available for the children.
Even though the court relied on this statute in ordering the state to
provide an adequate education for the handicapped at public expense,
it, like the court in P.A.R.C, gratuitously chose to comment upon the
constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs. The court determined that
the failure to provide education at public expense to handicapped children while providing education to non-handicapped children violated
the equal protection component of the due process clause.' 4 In addition, the court found that due process required a hearing prior to exclu-15
sion, termination or classification into a special education program.
These two cases are generally considered as the landmark decisions in
the area of special education and to have been the foundation for subsequent federal legislation 16 in this area.
The impact of P.A.R. C and Mills is evidenced by congressional
action which expanded federal special education assistance programs,
such as the Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974.17
Under this legislation, the congress required each state to establish a
goal of providing full educational opportunity for all handicapped children as a condition to receipt of federal financial assistance. 18 These
amendments also required the states to establish procedural safeguards
similar to those discussed in P.A. . C and Mills. 19 Later, in 1975, the
congress assumed greater financial responsibility for the education of
handicapped children when it passed the Education for All Handi11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
(current
18.
19.

343 F. Supp. at 296.
D.C. CODE §§ 31-201, 31-203 (Supp. 1978).
348 F. Supp. at 874.
Id. at 875.
Id.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 611-621, 88 Stat. 579 (amending 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1970))
version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976)).
20 U.S.C. § 1413(12)(A) (1976).
Id. at § 1413(13).
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capped Children Act of 1975.20 The purpose of the Education Act is to
provide handicapped children with:
[a] free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to
assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or
guardians are protected, to assist States and localities to provide for
the education of all handicapped children, and to assess and assure
the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped children. 2 1
In order to receive funding under the Education Act, each state must
submit a plan detailing its policies and procedures for educating the
handicapped. 22 Local agencies must apply to the state educational
agency and assure that the provisions of the Education Act are being
23
met as a prerequisite to receipt of federal funding.
24
The Education Act, and the regulations promulgated thereunder,
describe in detail the services and programs which must be instituted
by the states to qualify for federal financial assistance. For instance,
the states must identify, locate, and evaluate handicapped children and
provide a plan describing the facilities and services to be established
within the state. 25 The Education Act also requires that the local
school system develop and annually review a written individualized educational program for each handicapped child26 and that handicapped
27
children be "mainstreamed" whenever possible.
The parents and guardians of handicapped children also play an
important role under the Education Act. For example, the parents are
permitted to assist the local school system with development of the individualized educational program. 28 The Education Act also mandates
that the procedural safeguards established by the states include an opportunity for parents and guardians to examine school records, prior
notice to parents or guardians of proposed educational program
changes or refusals to initiate or change the identification, evaluation,
or educational placement of the child. 29 In addition, the Act requires
that the parents or guardian be notified of their right to file a complaint
with the educational agency regarding the child's identification, evalua20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Health,
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at §§ 1401-1461 [hereinafter referred to as the Education Act].
Id. at § 1401 note (Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, 775).
Id. at § 1413.
Id.at § 1414.
45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.1-121a.754 (1977) (the regulations, promulgated by the Department of
Education and Welfare, became effective October 1, 1977).
20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (1976).
Id. at § 1412(4).
Id.at § 1412(5)(B).
Id. at § 1414(a)(5).
Id. at § 1415(b)(1)(A).

RIGHT TO SPECIAL EDUCATION

tion or placement, 30 and have the opportunity for hearing before a neutral hearing examiner. 3' The hearing procedure includes the right to
appeal the decision of the hearing officer to the state educational
agency and, if the latter decision is unfavorable, to the state or federal
district court. 32 During the hearing stage, any party to the hearing has
the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and individuals
with special knowledge of the problems of handicapped children; to
present evidence; to confront, cross-examine and compel the attendof the hearings and to receive writance of witnesses; to obtain a record
33
decision.
and
ten findings of fact
SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF

1973

In addition to providing financial support for special education
programs, Congress has attempted to ban discrimination on the basis of
one's handicap by enacting Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. 34

This section provides that:

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States,
as defined in section 706(6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the beneany program or activfits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
35
ity receiving Federal financial assistance.
While the Education Act 36 functions as a funding statute to assist the
states in bearing the financial burden of educating the handicapped,
and conditions the extension of funds upon state compliance with the
mandates of the federal program, section 504 goes one step further.
Failure of public programs to comply with the mandate of section 504
will result in the termination of federal financial assistance to the entire
state education program, including non-handicapped education programs.
The final regulations, 37 issued by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 38 under section 504, require recipients of federal
assistance operating public elementary or secondary education programs to "provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
HEW.

Id. at § 1415(b)(l)(E).
Id. at § 1415(b)(2).
Id. at §§ 1415(c), 1415(e)(2).
Id. at § 1415(d).
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
Id.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
45 C.F.R. § 84 (1978).
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare will hereinafter be referred to as
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handicapped person who is in the recipient's jurisdiction, regardless of
the nature or severity of the person's handicap." 39 Recipients of federal
financial assistance, as defined by the regulations, include the states
and their instrumentalities or political subdivisions, as well as public
and private agencies, institutions, organizations or persons to which
such assistance is extended directly or indirectly. 40 Federal financial
assistance is also broadly defined. It includes grants, loans, contracts,
services of federal personnel, and use or interests in real or personal
property provided or made available by HEW. 4 ' The regulations define free appropriate education as "the provision of regular or special
education and related aids and services that. . . are designed to meet
individual educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as
the needs of non-handicapped persons. .. 42 without cost to the handicapped person or to his parents or guardian, except for those fees that
are imposed on non-handicapped persons or their parents or guardian.4 3 The regulations impose upon the recipients an affirmative duty
to identify and locate qualifying handicapped persons within their jurisdiction who are not receiving a public education and to inform these
individuals and their parents or guardian of the recipient's duty to provide a free appropriate public education. 44
The regulations incorporate by reference the enforcement provisions applicable to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 5 HEW
officials are required to initiate an investigation whenever a report,
complaint or any other source of information indicates a failure to
comply with the mandates of section 504.46 Termination of federal
funding may result after an administrative hearing and upon a finding
of a refusal to comply. 47 Any administrative action taken may be reviewed 4 8 in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Pro39. 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(a) (1976).
40. Id. at § 84.3(0.
41. Id. at § 84.3(h).
42. Id. at § 84.33(b)(1).
43. Id. at § 84.33(c).
44. Id. at §§ 84.32(a), 84.32(b).
45. Id. at §§ 84.61, 80.6-80.10, 81.1-81.131.
The language of Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is similar to Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Section 601 provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discnmination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976).
46. 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(c) (1978).
47. Id. at § 80.8.
48. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
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cedure Act.4 9
While the regulations promulgated pursuant to section 504 permit
the initiation of a department investigation upon receipt of a written
complaint of non-compliance filed not later than 180 days from the
date of the alleged discrimination,5 0 neither the regulations nor section
504 expressly provide for a private cause of action to enforce section
504. Nevertheless, courts have utilized the common law doctrine of

implication 5 and have determined that a private right of action is im52
plicit in section 504. In Lloyd v. Regional TransportationAuthority,
plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all mobility-disabled persons in the northeastern region of Illinois who were unable to use the
defendant's public transportation system because of their physical disabilities. Plaintiffs sought both preliminary and mandatory injunctions
to prevent the defendant from designing and operating any new federally funded facilities that would be inaccessible to mobility-disabled
persons, and to compel the defendants to make accessible the existing
transportation facilities. In Lloyd, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit viewed Lau v. Nichols 53 as conclusively establishing that affirmative rights under section 504 existed, and that a private cause of action to enforce these rights was permissible, even under
the stringent requirements delineated by the Supreme Court in Cort v.
Ash. 54 The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal order of the district
49. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
50. 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (1978). Such time period may be extended by HEW or its designee.
Id.
51. See Note, Emerging Standardsfor ImpliedActions Under FederalStatutes, 9 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 294 (1976) for a discussion of the doctrine of implication.
52. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
53. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). In Lau, the Supreme Court held that where a San Francisco school
district passively discriminated against non-English-speaking Chinese students by not offering
special services to enable the students to take advantage of the facilities, textbooks, and curriculum offered all students in the district, a private right of action could be implied to enforce the
affirmative duties not to discriminate under Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
414 U.S. at 566. The Seventh Circuit found Lau dispositive in Lloydbecause of the "near identity
of language in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Section 601 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ..
" 548 F.2d at 1281.
54. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the Supreme Court consolidated conflicting prior case law
concerning implication of a private cause of action and set out four relevant factors to determine
whether a private remedy could be implied in a statute not expressly providing one. 422 U.S. at
78-9. The Lloyd court summarized the criteria set forth in Cort as follows:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,
that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there
any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that
it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
548 F.2d at 1284 (citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Lloyd has been severely
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court 55 and remanded the case for consideration of the relief requested
by the plaintiffs. Other federal courts have followed the Seventh Circuit's lead where discrimination against the handicapped in an educational program was found. 56 However, in those actions which were
initiated subsequent to the effective date of the procedural enforcement
regulations issued by HEW, 57 the courts have also followed the Seventh Circuit's suggestion that the result might differ.5 8 For example, in
5 9 the plaintiff, a deaf graduCrawford v. University of North Carolina,
ate student, sought an injunction requiring the university to provide
and pay for interpreter services, claiming that the university's refusal to
do so violated his rights under section 504. The court viewed Lloyd as
authority for a private right of action under section 504, but noted that
Lloyd was decided prior to the issuance of the HEW regulations. Since
administrative remedies were now available to the plaintiff, he would
be required to pursue them. Nevertheless, the court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the university to provide free interpreter services, justifying its decision on the ground that the action was initiated
prior to the regulations. In Doe v. New York University,60 the plaintiff
sought injunctive relief under section 504 to compel a medical school to
readmit her as a student upon recovery from her mental disability
handicap. The court found that the exhaustion of plaintiff's administrative remedies was required and refused to enter either a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction which would require
plaintiffs readmission to the medical school.
Although the lower courts have required plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies subsequent to the effective date of the procedural
criticized for its failure properly to apply the Cort requirement. See Note, Toward Equal Rights
for Handicapped Individuals- JudicialEnforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 676 (1977).
55. 548 F.2d 1277, 1279-81 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussing the district court's memorandum opinion order).
56. See, e.g., Doe v. New York Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Crawford v. University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
57. 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1977).
58. In Lloyd, the Seventh Circuit stated:
We expressly leave open as premature the question whether, after consolidated procedural enforcement regulations are issued to implement Section 504, the judicial remedy
available must be limited to post-administrative remedy judicial review. In any event,
the private cause of action we imply today must continue at least in the form ofjudicial
review of administrative action. And until effective enforcement regulations are promulgated, Section 504 in its present incarnation as an independent cause of action should not
be subjugated to the doctrine of exhaustion. . . . But assuming a meaningful administrative enforcement mechanism, the private cause of action under Section 504 should be
limited to a posteriorijudicial review.
548 F.2d at 1286, n.29 (citations omitted).
59. 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
60. 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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enforcement regulations issued by HEW, 6 ' and it might thus appear
that the function of the courts in enforcing section 504 rights is now
merely one of review pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 62 the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
Cannon v. University of Chicago6 3 supports the argument for the existence of an implied right of action under section 504. In Cannon, the
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit" and held that a private
right of action could be implied to remedy an alleged violation of the
Education Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.65 The court
determined that the implication requirements as defined in Cort v.
Ash 66 were met and stated that the ". . . award of individual relief to a
private litigant who has prosecuted her own suit is not only sensible but
is fully consistent with-and in some cases even necessary to--the orderly enforcement of the statute. '67 Furthermore, the Court stated that
the individual suit was not inappropriate because of the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, pointing out that even HEW
took the position that the private remedy would assist in the achievement of the statutory purpose. 68 The Court noted that the complaint
procedures failed to permit the complainant to participate in the investigation and enforcement proceedings for Title IX violations, would not
61. 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1977).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). In cases involving judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, [hereinafter referred to as the APA], the reviewing court must set
aside actions found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), or action taken contrary to various constitutional,
statutory, or procedural requirements, id. at § 706(2)(F). See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-15 (1971). Denovo review of administrative decisions under the APA is
proper in only two situations: (1) where the agency action is adjudicatory in nature and the reviewing court finds that the administrative fact finding procedures were inadequate, and (2) "...
when issues that were not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory
agency action." 401 U.S. at 415.
63. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (1979).
64. 559 F.2d. at 1063 (7th Cir. 1977) (amended 1978). In Cannon, the Seventh Circuit found
that the individual plaintiff did not have an implied cause of action against the university for its
alleged discrimination on the basis of sex in denying her entrance into medical school. The court
distinguished the Lloyd case on the grounds that the plaintiff in Cannon was merely an individual
discriminatee, whereas the plaintiff in Lloyd was a member of a large class of plaintiffs. The
Seventh Circuit also stated that "in this instance, construing Title IX to provide a private cause of
action before the administrative remedy has been exhausted would be to violate the intent of
Congress." 559 F.2d at 1072-73. For a discussion criticizing the Seventh Circuit's application of
the tort requirements for implying a private right of action, see Note, Implied Rights ofAction to
Enforce Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378 (1978).
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
66. Supra, at note 54.
67. 99 S. Ct. at 1962.
68. Id. at 1963.
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necessarily insure relief for the complainant should a voluntary compliance agreement be reached between HEW and the funding recipient,
and did not insure a decision on the complaint within a reasonable
time.6 9 Because of the similarities in the language, purpose and enforcement procedures of Title IX and section 504, the recognition of a
private cause of action in Cannon clearly supports the existence of an
be utilized prior
implied private remedy under section 504 which may
70
remedies.
administrative
the
to the exhaustion of
In addition to the possible implied cause of action under section
504, the advocate should be aware of the possibility of bringing suit
against local school districts under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 71 This
action would be particularly useful where HEW provides insufficient
relief for past violations of section 504.72 Neither Cannon nor Lloyd
69. Id. at 1962-63.
70. For additional authority supporting the implied right of action under section 504, see
Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds,
No. 78-711 (U.S. July 11, 1979) and Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977). In these
cases, as in Crawford and Doe, the courts recognized Lloyd as authority for a private right of
action under section 504, without discussing whether the existence of a large class of plaintiffs was
indispensable to the maintenance of the action as required by the Seventh Circuit in Cannon.
Davis involved a suit brought by a hearing-disabled licensed practical nurse against Southeastern University which denied her admission to a program leading to certification as a registered
nurse. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the lower court in light of the newly issued HEW
regulations recognizing the plaintiff's right to a private cause of action under section 504 as an
individual discriminatee. 553 F.2d at 299-300. The Supreme Court in its first case interpreting
section 504, offered no express clarification on the issue in its response to Southeastern's contention that respondent could not seek judicial relief because section 504 did not provide for a private
cause of action, and Davis' counterargument that whether or not a private right of action existed
under section 504, she could maintain her suit under Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. 1983 (1976), and stated: "In light of our disposition of this case on the merits, it is unnecessary to address these issues and we express no views on them." 47 U.S.L.W. at 4691, n.5.
In Kampmeier, the court affirmed the lower court's denial of a preliminary injunction against
public school officials who refused to allow two visually impaired junior high students to participate in contact sports. The court found exclusion of the plaintiffs justified on the strength of
medical opinion relied on by the defendants to the effect that the plaintiffs were not otherwise
qualified to play contact sports due to the high risk of eye injury. The court saw that the plaintiffs
presented little evidence to cast doubt upon the defendant's rationale and that they therefore
failed to make a clear showing of probable success on the merits. 574 F.2d at 1159, 1161. Since
the HEW regulations were not yet in effect, the Second Circuit was not compelled to require the
plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies.
71. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
within the
personsecured
or
by jurisdiction
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
or other
immunities
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
72. In Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court expressly overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and held that a municipality (such as a
school district) is no longer immune from suit under section 1983 for constitutional violations
resulting from official municipal policy. However, in Monell, plaintiff alleged violation of a constitutional right clearly recognized by the Supreme Court in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
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precludes this avenue of relief.7 3
Whether or not the courts will have future occasion to imply a
private cause of action under section 504, their role in enforcing the
mandates of section 504 has not ended. For example, in N.A.A. C.P. v.
Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,74 plaintiffs, five organizations and six
individuals representing minority and handicapped persons residing in
the City of Wilmington, brought suit charging that the defendant's proposed relocation discriminated against them in violation of their rights
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Subsequent to commencing the suit against
the Wilmington Medical Center, plaintiffs asserted a cause of action
against the Secretary of HEW, challenging the constitutionality of the
administrative regulations promulgated by the Secretary in the implementation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Plaintiffs contended that the HEW regulations violated due process since they failed to provide:
(1) the right to submit relevant information to the Secretary in support of a complainant's position that he or she has suffered, or is
likely to suffer, discrimination at the hands of a recipient; (2) an
opportunity to review and comment upon proposed assurances, developed in the course of voluntary compliance negotiations, which
the Secretary has concluded will eliminate or substantially mitigate
the recipient's alleged discriminatory actions; and (3) if voluntary
compliance is nevertheless achieved, a right to a trial-type hearing
conducted by an impartial decisionmaker, together with other usual
414 U.S. 632 (1974). There has been no comparable Supreme Court recognition of a constitutional right of the handicapped child to an education. See San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). However, Rodriguez did not preclude such a finding where there
was an absolute deprivation. Id. at 36-37. In addition, the P.A.A C and Mills cases, albeit gratuitously, indicated that the denial of an appropriate education to the handicapped may be a violation of equal protection and due process. See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra. In addition,
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), recognized the requirements of due process in education, a
fourteenth amendment protection which could be vindicated by a section 1983 action.
73. In Cannon, a female plaintiff brought a civil rights suit against the University of Chicago
and Northwestern University, alleging that she was denied admission to their medical schools on
account of her age and sex. Her complaint alleged violation of her civil rights under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), and Title IX of the Education Amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (prohibiting sex discrimination in federally
funded programs). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the complaint's dismissal only because the plaintiff had failed to meet the state action requirement or establish a sufficient state nexus as required
under section 1983. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In a suit directly against a
public school district or state administrative agency, there would be no state action issue under
section 1983.
In Lloyd, the complaint was originally brought pursuant to section 1983, but this remedial
avenue was abandoned because of the Monroe v. Pape exclusion of "municipalities" from section
1983 coverage. 548 F.2d 1277, 1278 n.l (7th Cir. 1977). This roadblock no longer exists in light of
the Supreme Court's reversal of Monroe in Monell. See note 72, supra.
74. 453 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. 1978).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

protections of an adjudicatory proceeding, at which the complainant
may challenge the legal or factual sufficiency of the remedy
75 prescribed by the Secretary and acquiesced in by the recipient.
In response to the due process deficiencies alleged by the plaintiffs, the
court agreed with the Secretary's contention "that the plaintiffs' interests under Title VI and Section 504 [were] more attenuated, and thus
require fewer procedural protections, than more conventional forms of
'property' or 'liberty' interests created under state or federal laws," 76
and concluded that "the Secretary's procedures were sufficient." 77 The
court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that their right to equal protection
of the laws was violated by the regulations, which afforded a hearing to
applicants or recipients of federal funds before such grants could be
withheld or terminated, but denied a hearing on the merits to persons
charging a recipient with discrimination. The court reasoned that the
distinction was justified because of the "clear difference in interest created under Title VI and Section 504, the nature of the loss caused by
government action, and Congress' explicit direction that recipients
78
threatened with a fund cut-off be afforded an adversary hearing."
A problem which has arisen under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, and one which will provide an additional role for the courts in
the enforcement of section 504, is court action to require HEW to en79
force the mandate of Title VI. For example, in Adams v. Richardson,
certain black students, and other citizens and taxpayers brought suit to
secure declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of HEW,
alleging that HEW was derelict in its duty to enforce Title VI because
no appropriate action was taken to end segregation in public educational institutions receiving federal funds. The court recognized that
where a HEW request for voluntary compliance with the mandate of
Title VI was not followed by responsive action by the recipient within a
75. Id. at 335-36 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 337.
77. Id. The court supported its finding that the secretary's procedures were sufficient by
examining the case in terms of the analysis required in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
In Mathews, the Supreme Court stated:
[Ildentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of
three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Id.at 334-35, quotedin 453 F. Supp. at 338. An analysis of the Wilmington Medical Center court's
application of Mathews is beyond the scope of the article.
78. 453 F. Supp. at 347.
79. 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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reasonable time, the agency was required to initiate enforcement action. An action to compel HEW to insure compliance with section 504
would be particularly useful in speeding enforcement procedures and

procuring appropriate educational services which have not been provided.
THE RIGHT TO SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES IN ILLINOIS

The Illinois Constitution
Although the United States Supreme Court has refused to recog-

nize education as a right or fundamental interest guaranteed by the
federal constitution,8 0 the denial of a free education for the handicapped has been successfully challenged as violating the Education Article of the Illinois Constitution. 8 ' In Elliot v. Board of Education of
Chicago,8 2 the Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District declared
that the second paragraph of the Education Article requires that the
special education programs which have been established by the legislature be free of tuition charges through the secondary level. In Elliot, a
handicapped child was required to attend a non-public school because
of the defendant Chicago Board of Education's determination that the
special education programs of the Chicago Public Schools were inadequate to meet his needs. 83 The complaint sought a declaration that the
statute 84 which limited the amount of tuition the state was required to.
pay for the education of handicapped students attending non-public
schools to $2,500 per year violated the Education Article of the Illinois
Constitution and the equal protection clause of the federal 85 and state 86
80. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
81. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. X, § I provides:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all
persons to the limits of their capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational
institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall
be free. There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by
law.
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education.
82. 64 Ill. App. 3d 229, 380 N.E.2d 1137 (1978) (appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court denied).
83. For a discussion of non-public school placement for handicapped individuals, see text
accompanying notes 178-208 infra.
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1977) (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
§ 14-7.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (amendment effective Aug. 25, 1978)).
85. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a discussion of equal protection and the handicapped
child's right to an education under the federal constitution, see Alschuler, Education/or the Handicapped, 7 J.L. EDUC. 523, 528 (1978); Krass, The Right to Public Education/or HandicappedChildren.- A Primer/or the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1033; Note, The Education of/All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 110, 114 (1976).
86. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 2. The possible argument of basing a handicapped child's
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constitutions. Under the Illinois statute, the parents of the handicapped child had to pay all costs of educating their child in excess of
the arbitrary $2,500 ceiling on state funding, while parents of nonhandicapped children could obtain fee education through the secondary level. The court chose to resolve the controversy based upon the
Education Article only, thereby avoiding the necessity of deciding the
state8 7 and federal equal protection arguments raised by the plaintiff,
and stated that the second paragraph of the Education Article established an entitlement to free education through the secondary level for
those "programs of instruction other than the standard course of study
established in the public school system. ' 8 8 The appellate court held, in
effect, that once educationalprograms were established, the programs
89
must be free through the secondary level.
right to an appropriate education on the equal protection provision of the state constitution will
not be considered herein. For the most part, any equal protection argument based on the state
constitution would involve considerations not unlike those which have been made of the federal
constitution. See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
87. Indeed, there appears to exist a persuasive argument against basing the rights of handicapped children to an appropriate education on state equal protection grounds. This argument is
readily apparent upon a comparison of the state constitution's treatment of discrimination on the
basis of sex and on the basis of a handicap. The Illinois constitution prohibits private discrimination on the basis of sex in the sale of rental property and in the hiring and promotion practices of
any employer. It further guarantees that the equal protection of the laws shall not be denied by
the state, local governments or school districts on the basis of sex. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I,
§§ 17, 18. However, in regards to the handicapped, the Illinois constitution prohibits only discrimination in the sale of rental property and in the hiring and firing practices of employers. Id.
at art. I, § 19. There is a noticeable lack of any comparable provision guaranteeing that the equal
protection of the laws shall not be denied by the state, local governments or school districts on the
basis of one's handicap. Any equal protection argument under the state constitution will have to
come to grips with this rather significant gap in the state constitutional protection against discrimination.
88. 64 Ill. App. 3d at 235, 380 N.E.2d at 1142.
89. The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted the effect of the Education Article of the
Illinois constitution in several cases. In Blase v. State, 55 Ill.
2d 94, 302 N.E.2d 46 (1973), the
Illinois Supreme Court considered the contention of the plaintiff-taxpayers that the third paragraph of the Education Article required the state to provide not less than fifty per cent of funds
necessary to operate the public elementary and secondary schools. While the court noted that the
words contained in the sentence might appear to require the state to bear the greater part of the
burden of financing the education system, the court looked to the constitutional convention proceedings, 5 Record of Proceedings of 6th Ill.
Const. Convention of 1970 4502, in supporting the
state's contention that "the sentence was intended only to express a goal or objective, and not to
state a specific command." 55 II. 2d at 98, 302 N.E.2d at 48. See also Cronin v. Lindberg, 66 Ill.
2d 47, 360 N.E.2d 360 (1976).
Later, in Pierce v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 69 Ill. 2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977), the Illinois
Supreme Court interpreted the first paragraph of the Education Article as "a statement of general
philosophy, rather than a mandate that certain means be provided in any specific form." 69 Ill. 2d
at 92-3, 370 N.E.2d at 536. In Pierce, it was contended that the Chicago Board of Education had
breached the duty imposed by the Education Article and the special education provisions of the
Illinois School Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-4.01 (1977), by not placing the plaintiff student
in a special education class. The court stated that since there was no constitutional duty imposed
upon boards of education to place students in special education classes--because the Education
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The Illinois Statutes & Regulations
The Illinois General Assembly recently has revised the Illinois
School Code9° to bring it into technical compliance with the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act 9 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.92 In this section, the major provisions of the latest
Illinois legislative enactments, 93 and their attendant regulations 94 will

be discussed. In addition, certain past problems and inadequacies with
special education legislation will be examined. Although some of these
problems may have been ameliorated by new federal and state legislation, some may have been exacerbated by the uncertainty and confu-

sion which is usually wrought by an enormous body of new legislation
and underlying rules and regulations.
Although the intense national emphasis on the rights of the handicapped in education is only as recent as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act and Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Illinois has had
legislation dealings with the education of the handicapped since the
enactment of the Illinois School Code in 1961.95 While educational
programs for the handicapped were permissive at first, Illinois school
districts have been under a direct mandate since July 1, 1969 "to establish and maintain special education programs as needed .... -96
As early as 1965, a full range of handicaps which were suitable for
Article is not self-executing--such a duty would have to be gleaned from state statutes or attendant rules and regulations concerning the administration of special education programs. The Illinois Supreme Court then found, apparently after analyzing Section 14-8.01 of the Illinois School
Code and the State Board of Education's Rules and Regulations to Govern the Administration
and Operation of Special Education, that it was the "State Board of Education,. . . and not the
local school board, that is responsible for determining the eligibility of children for special education." 69 Ill.
2d at 92, 370 N.E.2d 537 (citation omitted). However, the continued validity of this
finding is in doubt in that the statutory basis for the court's ruling in Pierce recently has been
amended. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.01 (Cum. Supp. 1978). The statute now makes it
clear that the state board of education shall prescribe standards and criteria for admission to
special education programs, but that these standards must be "administered by local school
boards." Id. at § 14-8.01 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 1-1through 1201 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
91. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
93. The sections of the Illinois School Code which are concerned with special education for
the handicapped are located at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 14-1.01 through 14-14.01 (1977) and
§§14-1.03, 14-1.05, 14-1.08, 14-2.01, 14-3.01, 14-4.01, 14-6.01, 14-7.02, 14-7.03, 14-7.03a, 14-8.01,
14-8.02, 14-13.01 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
94. RULES AND REGULATIONS TO GOVERN THE ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF SPECIAL EDUCATION art. I-XV, Ill. Reg. Vol. 3, Issue No. 5, 934 (Feb. 2, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Rules].
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 14-1 through 14-12 (1961) (current version at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 122, §§ 14-1.01 through 14-14.01 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-4.01 (1965) (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, 144.01 (Cum. Supp. 1978)).
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special educational services had been defined by the Illinois School
Code. 9 7 Local school districts were mandated to provide special services for individuals with these handicaps by July 1969. However, in
1968 the School Code was amended to permit a school district to place
a handicapped child in a private school if the local public school program was inadequate to meet the child's special education needs. 98 So,
in Illinois at least, when the implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 became effective in the summer and fall of 1977, the
basic bureaucratic framework for administering special education services had existed for almost a decade. In fact, long before the concepts
of "mainstreaming" and "least restrictive alternative" were mandated
by federal legislation,9 9 Illinois had required that students enrolled in
special education programs "be housed in public school buildings with
students in the standard program."' t
Although the Illinois mandatory special education system has existed for almost a decade, it has been the subject of relatively few reported court decisions.' 0 ' Only in Elliot v. Board of Education of
Chicago01 2 has an Illinois court found the Illinois system of special education deficient in the face of state or federal constitutional requirements. 10 3 However, the specific Illinois School Code provision which
was struck down in Elliot was amended' °4 while the case was on appeal, probably curing the inadequacies which concerned the Elliot
court.
Local School DistrictResponsibility
The Illinois School Code requires local school boards to establish
and maintain the special education facilities necessary for handicapped
97. Id. at § 14-1.02 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-1.02 (1977)).
98. For a discussion of placing handicapped children in non-public schools, see text accompanying notes 178-208 infra.
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1976). See also Section 504 Rules and Regulations, 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.34(a) (1978).
100. RULES AND REGULATIONS TO GOVERN THE ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF SPECIAL EDUCATION § 3.04 (1974).
101. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Thomson, 504 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court should abstain from deciding pendant state issues concerning the special education provisions of the Illinois School Code. See also
Pierce v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 69 Ill. 2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977); Elliot v. Board of Educ.
of Chicago, 64 Ill.
App. 3d 229, 380 N.E.2d 1137 (1978).
102. 64 Ill. App. 3d 229, 380 N.E.2d 1137 (1978).
103. See text accompanying notes 82-89 supra.
104.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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children who are residents of the district. 0 In addition, the rules
promulgated under the school code mandate that the local school district is "responsible for providing and maintaining appropriate and effective education programs, at no cost to the child's parents, for all
exceptional children who are resident therein."'' 6 Local school districts are required to provide comprehensive programs of special education and related services for district residents between the ages of
three and twenty-one, either independently, or in cooperation with
other school districts, and "have a goal of providing full educational
opportunity to all handicapped children from birth to age three."' 07
Such comprehensive programs would include "[a] viable organizational and financial structure .. . 'o1 procedures for identifying and
evaluating the need for special education and related services,' 109 and
"a continuum of program options" which incorporate instructional
programs, resource programs,"' and related services,"' 12 "qualified
personnel"'' 3 and "[aippropriate and adequate facilities, equipment
and materials."' 14 The rules also require the local district to maintain a
relationship with other public and private agencies which are able to
supplement special education programs," l 5 to maintain "[interaction
with parents,"" 6 to provide for internal program evaluations," 7 and to
plan "for program growth." '" 8 Local districts are also required by the
rules to ensure that special education students participate to the greatest extent possible in non-handicapped programs, and thereby achieve
the greatest possible interaction with their non-handicapped peers.' '9
105.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-4.01 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Although the Illinois School Code

and the rules impose mandates on "local" districts, it is much more efficient, both economically
and administratively, for a number of local districts to join together collectively to discharge their
respective mandates. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.31 authorizes local districts to "enter into

joint agreements with other school boards to provide needed special educational facilities ...."
Most Illinois school districts have chosen to participate in special education "cooperatives." Hereafter when reference is made to a "local school district's" mandate or program, it is likely that the
mandate is being discharged, and the program is being provided by the local district's agent-the
special education "cooperative" to which the local district belongs.
106. Rules, supra note 94, at art. II, § 2.01.
107. Id. at art. II, § 2.02.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at art. II, § 2.02(1).
Id. at art. II, § 2.02(2).
See id. at art. III, § 3.02 for the required continuum of program options.
See id. at art. IV, § 4.06 for the rules regarding resource programs.
Id. at art. II, § 2.02(3). See also id.at art. V, § 5.01 for rules pertaining to related services.

113.
114.

Id. at art. II, § 2.02(4).
Id. at art. II, § 2.02(5).

115. Id. at art. II, § 2.02(6).
116.

Id. at art. II, § 2.02(7).

117. Id. at art. II, § 2.02(8).
118. Id. at art. II, § 2.02(9).
119. Id. at art. I, § 1.05; id. at art. III, § 3.04.
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The related services referred to in the rules are defined as "those
activities supplemental to the standard educational program, special
education instructional programs, or resource programs which serve to
facilitate the child's development. The activities must include evaluation, therapeutic or consultation services."' 20 Specifically, the related
services to be provided are "[sipeech and language services, ...
[s]chool psychological services [for those] students who require psychological evaluation and assistance in their educational or behavioral adjustment, . . . [s]chool social work services, . . . [s]pecial reader
services," physical and occupational therapy services-when necessary
for the student to receive the full benefit of the educational program
provided, other therapeutic services--"as required to facilitate the education of exceptional children," 12' and consultant services-as required
by the student's individual education plan. While the rules appear to
require the local district to provide a broad range of related services,
the rules offer little or no guidance as to the specific scope of these
mandated services. Particularly vague are the requirements that physical and occupational "therapy" services be provided where necessary to
permit students to receive the full benefit of the instructional programs
provided, 122 and that "other" therapeutic services as required be provided to "facilitate the education of exceptional children."' 123 Many
physical therapeutic services, and "other" therapeutic services such as
intense psychiatric therapy, can be characterized as purely "medical"
and outside the range of services required to be provided by the local
school district. However, "medical" services rendered to a student on
account of his or her particular handicap could also be characterized as
necessary for the student "to receive the full benefit from the instructional program provided [him or her]."' 24 The need for a clearly defined line between educationally related "therapy" and "medical
services" is highlighted by the recent amendment to Section 14-1.08 of
the Illinois School Code. 2 5 The statute defines "special educational
services" as including therapy, but expressly excludes medical services,
except as needed "only for diagnostic and evaluation purposes."' 126 A
120. Id. at art. V, § 5.01.
121. Id. at art. V, §§ 5.01(l)-5.01(6).
122. Id. at art. V, § 5.01(5)(a).
123. Id. at art. V, § 5.01(5)(b).
124. Id. at art. V, § 5.01(5)(a).
125. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-1.08 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
126. See also Rules, supra note 94, at art. I, § 1.08a which defines "related services" as including "medical services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes." The author has been involved in an
article X due process hearing concerning the appropriateness of a private school placement,
wherein the hearing officer directed that the student involved be given "psychiatric consultation."
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school district might validly question at what point the psychiatric care
ceases to be educationally related and becomes the provision of a
"medical service," for which the district is not financially responsible.
Because of the high cost of the related services, such as the cost of obtaining the expertise of a psychiatrist or of a licensed physical therapist,
the temptation for a local school district to designate such services as
purely "medical" appears to be great. On the other hand, parents will
be inclined to characterize necessary but expensive services, such as
physical and psychiatric therapy, as "educationally related" so that local school districts and state agencies would bear the total cost of these
services. This conflict is presently a fertile area of disagreement between parents, child advocates, and school districts. 127 These issues
will continue to be contested until either the Illinois Board of Education or the courts have defined the outer limits of "therapy" and "medical services" so that parental and school district responsibility may be
determined with some degree of certainty and with a minimal drain on
the Illinois Office of Education's due process hearing resources.
The greatest dilemma for local school districts providing mandated special education programs and facilities is the problem of adequately funding the programs from available state and local resources.
The rules provide that no handicapped student can be permanently excluded from the public school system because of the inability of the
district to provide an educational program.128 This rule, when considered in conjunction with the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of
12 9 in Blase v. State130
the Education Article of the Illinois Constitution
and Cronin v. Lindberg'3 1 -that the state is not required to shoulder the
bulk of the financial support for education programs and that state aid
can be conditioned upon the local district's compliance with educational standards set by the state-places a heavy responsibility upon
the local school district to provide the special education services required by the rules. 132 The funding dilemma and lack of adequate juThe provision of this "consultation" service by the school district, and payment for same, raises
some serious questions concerning the "therapy"/"medical services" distinction, as rule 5.05(6)(a),
Rules, supra note 94, at art. V, § 5.05(6)(a), permits that the psychiatric consultation involve a
"therapeutic component."
127. A number of due process hearing decisions rendered pursuant to article X of the rules,
Rules, supra note 94, at art. X, are presently at the Illinois Board of Education level of review on
this very issue. For a discussion of the due process hearings and review thereof, see text accompanying notes 153-177 infra.
128. Rules, supra note 94, at art. II, § 2.04.
129. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. X, § I.
130. 55 Il. 2d 94, 302 N.E.2d 46 (1973).
131. 66 Ill. 2d 47, 360 N.E.2d 360 (1976).
132. See discussion at note 89, supra.
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dicial remedy was poignantly raised in Board of Education School
District No. 150, Peoria v. Cronin,133 where the plaintiff school board
requested that the special education provisions of the Illinois School
Code be declared illegal because they were incapable of being performed. In this case, the school district argued that because of the reduction of education appropriations by the Governor of Illinois, the
school district did not receive full reimbursement from the State of Illinois for its special education claim, and that it was therefore impossible
for the district to budget for expenditures or to maintain fiscal responsibility. The court decided that the school district had failed to present a
justiciable question to the court, and that any action to alleviate the
school district's dilemma would have to come from the general assembly. The court said: "the creation of school systems and the manner of
financing and administering them is clearly a legislative prerogative
and that our judicial system cannot impose its views, its ideas, and its
will upon the General Assembly respecting such questions as were
raised in the instant case."' 34 It is clear that the local school districts
have been required by the general assembly to carry the heavy burden
of financial responsibility for the programs that it is required to initiate
for its residents. It places on the local districts the apparent duty to
raise the funds required to implement such programs through local taxation. The Illinois School Code and the rules promulgated thereunder
fail to provide how the .special education programs to which local residents are entitled will be provided should the local taxpayers fail to
approve the additional tax required to finance such programs.
A third problem for local districts is determining the residency of
handicapped children. Such an issue typically arises when a local
school district program cannot deal with a particularly profound handicap, and the child is placed as an in-patient in a residential facility
located outside the school district within which his or her parents or
guardian resides. The issue of residency for school purposes is crucial
because the school code requires the school district in which the child
resides to provide any necessary cost of transportation and to pay to the
school district actually operating the special education program the per
capita cost of educating the child when the child attends school in an133. 51 IlL.
App. 3d 993, 367 N.E.2d 501 (1977).
134. Id. at 841-42, 367 N.E.2d at 504. Other courts which have considered the lack of funds
issue offered as a defense for the state's failure to provide education to handicapped children have
explicitly rejected the defense. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875-76
(D.D.C. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377 (N.D. Ala. 1972), affdsub nor, Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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other district because of his or her handicap. 35 This issue may also
arise where a child temporarily resides with relatives in another school
district in order to take advantage of that district's superior program.
Fortunately, the Illinois courts have provided some guidance in this
area. Generally, children are presumed to reside in the district where
their parents reside, although the presumption may be rebutted by circumstances showing a different residence.' 36 Each particular case demands an examination of circumstances relating to parental control
and custody.
In School District No. 153, Cook County v. School District No.
154 V2, Cook County, 13 7 SPEED Cooperative filed suit for declaratory
judgment against ECHO Cooperative based on ECHO's refusal to enroll a handicapped child whose parent resided in a school district
served by the ECHO Cooperative. The child had been placed by her
mother in a residential facility located within a school district served by
the SPEED Cooperative. The ECHO Cooperative refused to admit the
child when the residential facility attempted to enroll her, claiming that
the child's legal residence was the residential facility and therefore the
ECHO Cooperative and the school district within which the parent resided was no longer responsible for the child's education. The court
held that the child's mother had not relinquished custody and control
over the child, who had been placed in the residential facility only to
take advantage of the rehabilitative program and returned home on
weekends. The court also declared that so long as the school district of
the parent's residence and the ECHO Cooperative were unable or unwilling to provide educational facilities for the child, the SPEED Cooperative would have to do so, but that its costs would be reimbursed by
the parent's home district. 138 This finding, that the district in which the
child is actually located must "provide" the services if the "responsible" district will not or cannot, is consistent with the official analysis
and interpretation of the federal rules and regulations adopted pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The official interpretation provides that: "in no case may a recipient refuse to provide
services to a handicapped child in its jurisdiction because of another
person's or entity's failure to assume financial responsibility."'1 39 While
135. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.01 (1977).
136. See, e.g., Turner v. Board of Educ., 54 1U. 2d 68, 294 N.E.2d 264 (1973); Kraut v. Rockford, 51 111. App. 3d 206,.366 N.E.2d 497 (1977).
137. 54 I11.
App. 3d 587, 370 N.E.2d 22 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as SPEED v. ECHO].
138. Id. at 592, 370 N.E.2d at 26 (referring to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.01 (1977)).
139. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,690 (1977).
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the SPEED v. ECHO decision helps determine which of the two possible districts is responsible for paying for special education services,
both the SPEED decision and federal regulations make it clear that an
eligible child is entitled to the provision of services by the school district
in which he or she is located, notwithstanding any underlying dispute
between the two school districts as to which district must pay for those
services.
Identiocation,Evaluation and Placement
In addition to defining the responsibilities of the local school district for developing educational programs geared to each handicapped
individual's needs, the Illinois Rules and Regulations to Govern the
Administration and Operation of Special Education require the local
school district to develop and implement procedures necessary to create
public awareness of the rights of exceptional children and special education programs. 140 It is incumbent upon the district, at least annually,
to disseminate information to the community at large and specifically
to all parents within the district regarding the special education programs and services available in or through the district, in each of the
major languages represented in the district and in a manner understandable without regard to ethnic or cultural background as well as to
141
the hearing and visually disabled.
Once a child is identified through the screening process as a child
who experiences problems which interfere with the child's educational
progress, or once there is reason to believe that a child may require
special education services, the child must be referred for a case study
evaluation.142 The local school district is directly responsible for overseeing the referral, deciding whether any action should be taken, and
initiating the procedures, if necessary. 143 The school district may
choose to conduct a preliminary evaluation to determine whether a formal case study evaluation is necessary, but should the school district
decide not to conduct a formal case study evaluation, such decision is
reviewable in an impartial due process hearing which may be demanded by the parent pursuant to article X of the rules.144 Whether or
not the school district determines that a formal case study evaluation is
required, the district must notify the person who made the referral of
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Rules, supra note 94, at art. IX, § 9.01.
Id.
Id. at art. IX, § 9.03.
Id.
Id. at art. X, §§ 10.01-10.
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its decision, and in all cases must notify the parents or guardian of the
determination. If the district determines that a case study or re-evaluation of the child, or that initial placement of an exceptional child in a
special education program or related services program is necessary, the
district must obtain the parent's consent to place the child in the pro45
gram. 1
Any formal case study evaluation of a child must be appropriate to
the nature of the problems stated in the initial referral. The intensity of
the procedures are flexible and are determined by the complexity of the
child's problems.14 6 The rules provide specific procedures when the
child's problems are limited to the area of speech and language, or
where a child requires placement at home or in a hosptial due to temporary physical impairment. 47 In all other cases, rules mandate that
the comprehensive case study include an interview with the child, a
consultation with the parents, a complete social developmental study, a
medical history and current health report, a vision and hearing screening, a review of academic history and current educational functioning,
and that the district must formulate specialized evaluations specific to
the nature of the child's problems. 4 8 Specialized evaluations may include psychological and medical examinations. Any case study must
be conducted in a manner that insures no discrimination will occur due
to linguistic, cultural, racial and sexual factors. The language used to
evaluate the child must be consistent with his or her language use pattern, and any psychological evaluation may only be performed by a
certified school psychologist who has demonstrated competency in and
knowledge of the child's language and culture. Any test or other evaluation materials utilized must be validated for the specific purpose for
which it is being used, and also must be selected and administered so as
not to be racially or culturally discriminatory. If the parents or guardians disagree with the evaluation obtained by the school district, an independent evaluation may be obtained at public expense, unless the
school district initiates a due process hearing prior to the independent
49
evaluation and the district's evaluation is deemed appropriate.
Once the formal case study evaluation is completed, a multidisciplinary conference' 50 is convened to formulate program service op145. Id. at art. IX, § 9.06.
146. Id.at art. IX, § 9.09.
147. Id. at art. IX, §§ 9.09(1), 9.09(2).
148. Id. at art. IX, § 9.09(3).
149. Id.at art. IX, § 9.09(3)(i)(6).
150. A multidisciplinary conference is described as: "a deliberation among appropriate persons for purpose of determining eligibility for special education, developing recommendations for
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tions. Such conference must include the parents, along with
representatives of the local district, the special education director,
school personnel involved in the child's evaluation, and those persons
who will become responsible for providing a special education program
or service to the child. The purpose of the conference is to establish an
understanding of the child's learning characteristics and to determine
the child's eligibility for special education programs and/or related
services, the extent to which the child's needs may be met by the standard program and the nature and degree of special education required.
The rules provide that the recommendations made at the conference be
made by consensus, 5 ' but no guidance is offered as to the resolution of
any conference disagreement.
Within thirty days of the multidisciplinary staff's determination
that placement in a special education program or utilization of related
services is necessary, an additional meeting is required for the purpose
of developing an individualized education program. 52 The school district is required to insure parent participation in the development of the
IEP, and must use alternative methods when the parents are unable to
attend, such as individual or conference telephone calls. The meeting
may only be conducted without parental attendance if the district is
unable to convince the parents to attend. However, the district must
document its attempts to arrange a mutually agreeable place and time.
At least ten days prior to actual placement, parents must be notified, in
writing, of the results of the case study evaluation, the programs or
services needed by the child, the placement recommendations and the
plan for implementing them, and of the right to object. The parents
may agree to the placement and waive the ten day interval before
placement. Should the parents object to the placement, the local district must arrange a conference to resolve the disagreement. The failure to resolve the disagreement at this conference may result in a
request for an impartial due process hearing.

special education placement, reviewing education progress, or considering the continuation or
termination of special education for an individual child." Id. at art. I, § 1.05a.
151. Id. at art. IX, § 9.17.
152. The rules define an individualized education program [hereinafter referred to as IEP] as:
a written statement for an exceptional child that provides at least a statement of: the
child's present levels of educational performance; annual goals and short-term instructional objectives; specific speal l education and related services; the extent of participa
tion in the regular education program; the projected dates for initiation of services;
anticipated duration of services, appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures; and a schedule for annual determination of short-term objectives.
Id. at art. I, § 1.02a.
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The ImpartialDue Process Hearing
Illinois statutes 53 and the attendant rules 5 4 permit parents,
guardians, the local school district, or the child to request an impartial
due process hearing to resolve disagreements concerning the child's
proper placement, change, continuation, or termination of placement
after all informal procedures have been completed. These procedures
may also be utilized to object to the school district's failure to provide
adequate related services or instructional and resource programs, to
comply with the Illinois School Code or the rules, or to provide the
child with a free appropriate education. It is incumbent upon the local
district to notify the parents or guardian in writing of both the right to a
hearing, and the procedures to follow, as well as to inform them of any
free or low cost legal or other services available to aid them. The request for a hearing must be made in writing to the superintendent of
the local school district in which the child is a resident, and, where the
request is made pursuant to the parent's receipt of a notification regarding proposed placement, it must be made within ten calendar days of
the receipt of the notice. 55 Within five calendar days of receipt of the
request for the hearing, the school district must either request the Illinois Office of Education to appoint an impartial hearing officer or notify the parents or guardian of the decision not to honor the request for
the hearing and the reasons for the denial. Should the local district fail
to honor the request for the hearing, or if the district fails to provide a
hearing, an appeal may be taken directly to the Illinois Office of Education. 56 The Illinois Office of Education, within five days of the receipt
of the local district's request for the appointment of an impartial hearing officer, will provide a list of five trained impartial hearing officers
who are neither employees of the Illinois Office of Education, the local
district, any joint agreement or cooperative program in which the district participates, nor residents of the district involved. Such prospective officers must not have been involved with any decisions made
about the child's identification, evaluation or placement, and may not
have any conffict of interest which might impair their objectivity. The
selection of the impartial hearing officer is made jointly by the parents
or guardian and the school district alternately striking names from the
153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
154.

Rules, supra note 94, at art. X, §§ 10.01-10.

155. If the request for the impartial due process hearing is not made within this ten-day period, the hearing may then be requested at any time subsequent to placement of the child. Id. at
art. X, § 10.03(2).
156. Id. at art. X, § 10.05(2).
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list, within five calendar days of the date that the local district receives
the list from the Illinois Office of Education. Within five days of Illinois Office of Education's appointment of the hearing officer selected
by the parents or guardian and the local district, the hearing officer is
required to set a time and place for the hearing which is not later than
fifteen days from the officer's appointment. Prior to the hearing, the
parents or guardian must be informed of the right to inspect and copy
the child's school records, and of the right to request an independent
evaluation of the child, both at the expense of the parents or guardian.
The parents may also require the attendance of any person having relevant information concerning the abilities and needs of the child or
about the proposed programs. Subpoenas may be utilized by the hearing officer to require the attendance of such persons.
At the hearing, which is designated as non-adversary and directed
towards the presentation of all the facts necessary for the hearing officer to make a decision,' 57 each party may be represented by counsel at
the expense of the respective party. All of the parties and their representatives are permitted to participate in the hearing according to procedures established by the impartial hearing officer.' 58 Any party to
the hearing may prohibit the introduction of any evidence not disclosed
to them at least five days before the hearing. 59 The hearing examiner
is required to insure that interpreters are made available if needed, and
that the parents or guardian are aware of and understand their rights
and responsibilities. The hearing officer may require further information or evidence where necessary to complete the record and may order
that the child receive an independent evaluation at the expense of the
local school district. 6° The school district has the burden of presenting
"evidence that the special education needs of the child have been appropriately identified and that the special education program and related services proposed to meet the needs of the child are adequate,
appropriate and available." 16 ' The parents and the school district have
the right to present testimony, cross-examine and confront all witnesses
presented. 62 It is the responsibility of the school district to make a
record of the hearing, and the parents have the right to obtain a written
or electronic record of the hearing as well as the written findings of fact
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.at art. X, § 10.06b.
Id. at art. X, § 10.07(2)(d).
Id.at art. X, § 10.07(2)(f.
Id.at art. X, §§ 10.09(1)-10.09(4).
Id.at art. X, § 10.11a.
Id. at art. X, § 10.12.
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and decision; 163 however, the rules fail to indicate whether a record will
be made available to the parent or guardian without charge. The hearing officer must render a decision within ten school days after the hearing's conclusion, and such decision is binding upon the school district
64
and the parent unless appealed.
The rules provide that any party may appeal the decision of the
hearing officer to the state superintendent of education by submitting
the request and the reasons for appeal to the Illinois Office of Education within fifteen calendar days of the receipt of the hearing officer's
determination. 6 5 During the pendency of the appeal, as in the initial
impartial due process hearing stage, there can be no change in the
placement of the child unless the state superintendent of education determines that the safety and health of the child or others would be endangered. 66 The appeal is considered by a reviewing panel comprised
of attorneys and educational employees of the Illinois Office of Education, and is based upon the materials provided by the parties including
the hearing record. 167 The rules state that the reviewing panel has discretion as to whether the parties should be afforded an opportunity to
present oral and/or written testimony.168 However, it appears that this
particular rule is in direct conflict with the newly. amended Section 148.02 of the Illinois School Code. 169 This statute provides that:
The parties to the appeal shall be afforded the opportunity
0 to present
oral argument and additional evidence at the review.17
Therefore, it seems that the reviewing panel no longer has the discretion to afford the opportunity for oral argument and presentation of
additional evidence, but that the opportunity is mandated by statute.
The rules go on to provide that the Illinois superintendent of education makes the final decision after the reviewing panel submits its
report and recommendations, and may dismiss the appeal if he deems
it to be lacking in substance.' 7' While the rules designate the decision
of the state superintendent as "final and binding on all parties," and
requires the implementation of the decision by the local school district, 17 2 the statute again seemingly provides the contrary. Section 14163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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10.14.
10.15.
10.16.
10.18.
10.19.
10.20.
169. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Rules, supra note 94, at art. X, § 10.21.
172. ld. at art. X, §§ 10.23, 10.24.
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8.02 of the Illinois School Code expressly states that a civil action may
be brought by any party aggrieved by the decision of the state superintendent. 17 3 Judicial review of the state superintendent's finding is not
limited to the narrow strictures of the Administrative Review Act' 74 but
is apparently a trial de novo on the issues presented throughout the
statutory hearing and review process. The statute provides that:
[T]he court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and
basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence
shall grant
175
such relief as the court determines is appropriate.
This apparent conflict between the rules and the statute is significant
for several reasons. First of all, the rules provide for some rather severe
sanctions which may be visited upon a local school district for failure to
implement the "final and binding" decision of the state superintendent
of education. Rule 10.24 provides that the state superintendent's decision may be enforced by "denying approval of special education programs, denying personnel reimbursement, reducing school district
recognition status, or by such other measures as may be appropriate." 176 The rules do not provide for a stay of decision implementation,
or imposition of sanctions, pending outcome of the judicial review.
The availability of judicial review of the state superintendent's decision
is significant for another reason; that is, the requirement imposed by
Section 14-8.02 of the Illinois School Code:
During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to
this Section,. . . the student shall remain in the then current educational placement of such student, or if applying for initial admission
to the school district, shall, with the consent of the parents or guardian, be placed in the school
district program until all suchproceedings
177
have been completed.

Due to the time element in securing a judicial decision through the
trial and appellate process, many placement disputes will become moot
where judicial review is sought because the Illinois School Code requires "current placements" to be maintained, and "initial placements"
sought by the parents to be granted "until all such proceedings have
been completed." Therefore, a parent who disagrees with a district's
refusal to enroll his or her child in the district programs can secure that
enrollment for a number of years by demanding a hearing and seeking
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279 (1977).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Rules, supra note 94, at art. X, § 10.24.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
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judicial review of an unfavorable ruling by the hearing officer or state
superintendent.
State Operatedand Private Programs
Although the local school district is mandated to "provide" special
education and related services where appropriate, it was quite apparent
to drafters of the Illinois School Code that some child might exhibit
such extreme and unique characteristics that no local special education
program could adequately meet the child's needs. Therefore, the Illinois legislature authorized local districts to discharge their mandates in
these situations by allowing the local districts to avail themselves of
other important resources-in-state or out-of-state private schools, private special education facilities, and out-of-state public schools. 178 It is
manifestly more practical, both financially and logistically, to utilize
existing private or public programs than to force a local district to duplicate these resources by developing a local program for a unique
handicap, the incidence of which may be so infrequent that the development of a program would not be justified. The legislature expressly
acknowledged this reality when it added a new introductory sentence to
Section 14-7.02 of the Illinois School Code:
The General Assembly recognizes that non-public schools or special
education facilities179provide an important service in the educational
system in Illinois.
However, several caveats have been affixed to the availability of
private resources in order to deter local districts from relaxing efforts to
develop local programs in deference to private resources. Rule 8.02 of
the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Administration and Operation of Special Education provides that: "[t]he availability of community resources as an extension of the public school education program
in no way relieves the local district of its responsibility to provide a
comprehensive program of special education nor of its responsibility to
the individual student."'' 8 0 Also, the local district which is sending its
handicapped residents to a private program is not eligible for reimbursement from the state for payments which it makes to the private
facility unless the local district certifies to the Illinois State superintendent of education that the special education program of the district is
178. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978). In addition, the special education
program of another Illinois public school is a significant resource which may be available. Id. at
ch. 122, § 14-7.01. See School Dist. 153 v. School Dist. 154 /, 54 Il.App. 3d 587, 370 N.E.2d 22
(1977), for an example of the applicability of section 14-7.01 prior to amendment.
179. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (effective Aug. 25, 1978).

180. Rules, supra note 94, at art. VIII, § 8.02.
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unable to meet the needs of the child, because of his or her unique
handicap, and the state superintendent finds that the local district is in
"substantial compliance" with the legislative mandate to provide special education programs as needed.' 8 ' In this context, alternative stateoperated or private programs may be utilized by the local district.
Where the multi-disciplinary conference has determined that the local
school district's special education program is unable to meet the child's
needs because of the child's unusual handicap, the district must locate
an appropriate state-operated or private program which can accommodate the child's handicap. 8 2 If the non-public school, public out-ofstate school, or private special education facility provides the special
education services required by the child and is in compliance with the
Rules and Regulations to Govern the Administration and Operation of
Special Education, the school district in which the child is a resident
must pay either the actual cost of tuition for special education and related services, excluding room and board, or $4,500 per year, whichever
is less.' 8 3 The school district making tuition payments may be reimbursed by the state for the amount of the payments to the private facility which exceed the per capita tuition costs for students who are not
receiving special education services. If the cost of the appropriate special education program's tuition and related services increases more
than ten per cent over the previous year, or exceeds $4,500 per year, the
child may not be placed in the program unless the costs are approved
by the Governor's Purchase Care Review Board.184 The review board
has established emergency rules and regulations for its operation, and
uniform standards and criteria for review of such programs. 8 5 If the
review board approves tuition costs in excess of $4,500, the local district
181. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 144.01 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
182. Rules, supra note 94, at art. VIII, § 8.03. The parents may unilaterally place a child in a
private program if the district has an appropriate program for the child. However, the school
district is not responsible for funding this type of placement and the parents bear the financial
burden of unilateral placement. Id. at art. VIII, § 8.04.1. Therefore, the question of whether a
district's program is appropriate for a child is one of the most common questions encountered in
the due process hearings, id. at art. X, because the answer to the question may well determine if a
parent will legally be required to pay the cost of a private placement.
183. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
184. Id. [hereinafter the Governor's Purchase Care Review Board will be referred to as the
review board].
185. Emergency Rules of the Governor's Purchase Care Review Board, Ill. Reg. Vol. 2, Issue
No. 52, 178 (Dec. 29, 1978) (effective Dec. 19, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Emergency Rules]. Although the stated purpose of the emergency rulemaking was to comply with the statutory requirement that the review board "establish uniform criteria and standards which it will follow," ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978), an examination of the Emergency Rules discloses no such "criteria and standards," apart from some general reiteration of statutory requirements. Also, section 14-7.02 does not clearly define the limits of the review board's power to
establish "allowable costs," but intimates that the board's power may be limited to verifying that
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must pay the excess; however, the district is eligible for reimbursement
from the state for payments in excess of the per capita tuition charge
for students not receiving special education services.
The provision of special education services through state-operated
or private programs may create serious obstacles to the provision of
free education to handicapped children, notwithstanding the statement
86
in the statute that services provided be "at no cost to the parents."'
The $4,500 cost limitation may again raise the question considered in
Elliot v. Boardof Educationof Chicago. 87 In Elliot, the court held that
a provision 188 of the school code limiting the amount of the tuition to
be paid by the local school district for special education services in a
non-public school or special education facility to $2,500 per year violated the Education Article of the Illinois Constitution 8 9 because the
parent would have been responsible for actual costs in excess of $2,500.
The $2,500 ceiling provided in the school code has now been elevated
to $4,500, and the review board now has the authority to approve tui0 However, it
tion and related service costs that exceed the limitation. 19
is not at all clear whether the review board must in fact approve the
excess expense. The mere fact that the review board has the power to
approve implies it also has the power to disapprove. But, the review
board's disapproval of tuition and related service expenses could violate the Elliot court's interpretation of the second paragraph of the education article-that special education programs which have been
established by the legislature be free of tuition charges through the secondary level.
Another substantial area of uncertainty concerning the effect of
"cost approval" on the ability of the local district and state to provide
services "at no cost to the parent" involves the legislature's disclaimer
in Section 14-7.02 of the Illinois School Code:
In no event, however, shall the State's liability for funding of these
tuition costs begin until after the legal obligations of third party
payors have been subtracted from such costS. 19 1
"all fees, tuitions, and charges are fair and justified." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (Cum.
Supp. 1978).
186. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1977).
187. 64 Ill. App. 3d 229, 380 N.E.2d 1137 (1978) (appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court denied). See text accompanying notes 82-89 supra.
188. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1977) (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
§ 14-7.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978)).
189. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. X, § 1, 2.
190. Emergency Rules, supra note 185, at 3.40.
191. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). Third party
payors would include, for example, insurance companies, public aid, and medicaid.
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This limitation on the state's liability is extremely crucial in that, presumably, in allowing the state to reduce its liability by the amount of
third party payor's legal obligations, as opposed to funds actualy received from third party payors, the legislature may have placed the parent in the position of having actually to collect the legal obligations
from third party payors. The alternative may be that the handicapped
child's parents will be faced with a contractual liability to the private
facility for the uncollected payments from third party sources, notwithstanding the fact that the parent or facility may be legally entitled to
such payment. A lawsuit by the parent or private facility may then be
necessary to vindicate such an entitlement, but this would hardly be "at
no cost to the parent."
Equally uncertain is what will happen to the parent's liability to
the private facility for providing special education services to their
child if funds appropriated by the general assembly for purposes of
reimbursing school districts for payments to private facilities are inadequate to meet claims for such reimbursement. The statute provides
that the funds so appropriated shall "be apportioned on the basis of
claims approved,"' 192 but does not specify the attendant interrelationship between the local district, the private provider of services and the
parent, other than to state that services shall be provided "at no cost to
the parent." Whether the private program framework will indeed provide services to children at "no cost to the parent" will remain unanswered until the Illinois State Board of Education has had an
opportunity to administer Section 14-7.02 of the Illinois School Code
and article VIII of the rules.
Finally, another new element of section 14-7.02 is the funding of
19 3
room and board costs for placement of a child at a private facility.
This additional element of funding is important in light of the expense
involved with providing room and board services such as those provided by residential pediatric facilities, and because of the substantial
expense which is involved. 194 Room and board costs, when approved
by the review board, are to be paid to the private facility by the appropriate state agency,' 95 such as the Illinois Department of Mental Health
and Developmental Disabilities or the Illinois Department of Public
192. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
193.

Id.

194. Some of the private facilities listed in the state superintendent's memorandum on "Interim Tuition, and Room and Board Rates for Non-Public Facilities" are approved for costs in
excess of $30,000.
195. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.01 (1977) provides that:
[S]tate agencies (other than the State Board of Education) providing special education
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Aid. However, if these costs are not picked up by another state agency,
the costs will be paid by the state board of education. 196 Unfortunately,
the review board's emergency rules are again vague in the area of providing ascertainable standards with which local school districts and private providers of services may determine what room and board costs
will be approved or disapproved. The review board's emergency rule
3.30, "Cost Finding," 197 is in apparent conflict with the underlying statute.198 The emergency rule provides that allowable costs for room and
board will be lodging costs determined to exist as of September 1977
increased by a flat ten per cent. This formula is totally unrelated to the
concept of "actual cost" for room and board. Emergency rule 3.30 also
provides that, for both programatic and residential costs: "[w]here the
[Purchased Care Review] Board deems either methodology yields inappropriate allowable costs, it may approve different allowable costs.
However, it must set forth its specific reason for doing so." 199
Again, there seems to be no certain standard to which either the
local school board or a private provider of services may look for guidance when making residential placements and seeking funding therefor. The express wording of emergency rule 3.30 clearly raises the
probability that much of the cost approval and funding will be accomplished on an ad hoc basis. This uncertainty may well jeopardize the
program continuity which is necessary to provide special education
services to the child involved, and may also put the parents in between
the local school district and the private provider of services who have
found their expectations of funding dashed, and are looking for someone to pay the bills.
ParochialandPrivate Non-Sectarian Schools
Even though the Illinois School Code and the attendant rules provide that all children shall receive a free education in the public school
system, the federal regulations adopted pursuant to the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act state that the parents of a child may
choose to send the child to a non-public school, such as a parochial
school or private non-sectarian school, for standard education rather
shall continue to provide these servand related services, including room and board.
ices according to current law and practice.
It is probable that this attempt to base agency responsibility on "current practice" of three or four
separate state agencies will be a breeding ground for clarifying litigation.
196. Id. at ch. 122, §§ 14-7.02, 14-8.01 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
197. Emergency Rules, supra note 185, at 3.30.
198.

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (Cum. Supp. 1978).

199. Emergency Rules, supra note 185, at 3.30.
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than take advantage of the free public education. 200 In these situations,
the state and its local educational agencies must design their special
education programs so that handicapped children in non-public
schools can participate in the special education and related services offered by the local educational agencies. 20 1 The federal regulations state
that:
(a) Each local educational agency shall provide special education
and related services designed to meet the needs of private school
handicapped children residing in the jurisdiction of the agency
[school district].
(b) Each local educational agency shall provide private school
handicapped children with genuine opportunities to participate in
consistent with the number of
special education and related services
20 2
those children and their needs.
The rules further provide that services to non-public school handicapped children may be provided through such arrangements as dual
enrollment, educational radio and television, or mobile educational
services and equipment. 20 3 Also, public school personnel may be made
available in other than public school facilities, but only to the extent
necessary to provide services which are not normally provided by the
private school and are required by the handicap. Under the rules, these
services will be funded by the federal government. However, these
funds may not be used to pay the salaries of teachers or other employees of the private schools, nor may they be used to finance the existing
level of instruction in the private schools. 2° 4 Services to non-public
school students must be comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity
20 5
to those provided to public school children with equal needs.
Although the foregoing discussion is based solely on federal regulations, the discussion is nonetheless pertinent to an analysis of Illinois'
program because it has failed to guarantee parochial student accessability to special education programs. The state board of education, in
200. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.403(a) (1977).
201. Id. at § 121a.403, official comments app. A. The official comments provide that:
Free appropriate public education must be made available at no cost to the parents. If
the parents felt that services were not adequate, they may have a due process hearing to
show that more or better services must be provided to give their child FAPE. However,
if the parents choose not to educate their child in the public school system, they are not
required to do so. In that case the relevant public agency has the remaining duty of
offenng special education and related services under sections 121a.450-121a.460, but
does not have the duty of insuring that the private school meets the requirements of Part
B (unless other handicapped children have been placed in or referred to that private
school by the agency), or of paying for the cost ofthe private school.
202. Id. at § 121a.452(a)(b) (enacted pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(A) (1976)).
203. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.454 (1977).
204. Id. at §§ 121a.459, 121a.460.
205. Id. at § 121a.455.
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the draft of its Fiscal Year 1979 Annual Program Plan Amendment,
has set forthproposed procedures and legislation which would guarantee participation of private school children. 20 6 Even though the legislative authority for the state board of education's proposed policy and
rule changes finally passed the legislature, 20 7 the proposed additions to
the Illinois Rules and Regulations to Govern the Administration and
Operation of Special Education were not effected. The very pertinent
issue then becomes one of whether the State of Illinois is in compliance
with the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in the area of
guaranteeing program accessibility to parochial students. As the Illinois draft itself concedes: "(existing efforts) are not sufficient in themselves, . . . to meet the mandates" of the Education Act. It would
therefore seem that all of the aforementioned steps would be necessary
20 8
to effect compliance.
CONCLUSION

The handicapped child now has an immense resource of statutorily and judicially defined rights upon which to draw in search of a free
and appropriate, if not equal education. However, it should be apparent to the practitioner that some of those rights which are provided in
law are not necessarily implemented in reality. But there is no reason
why all parties involved in education of the handicapped should not
have their respective rights recognized and implemented as the courts
and legislature have provided numerous and effective remedial measures to ensure the practical realization of theoretical rights.

206. Illinois State Board of Education Fiscal Year 1979 Annual Program Plan Amendment
for Part B of the Education of the Handicapped Act, as Amended by Pub. L. 94-142, art. XI, pp.
66-69.
207. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-6.01 (1979).

208. Illinois State Board of Education Fiscal Year 1979 Annual Program Plan Amendment
for Part B of the Education of the Handicapped Act, as Amended by Pub. L. 94-142, art. XI, p. 67.
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